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International Regulation of the Sale
and Use of Pesticides
Charlotte Uram *
This Article discusses international regulation of the sale and use of
pesticides. It examines and compares national, regional, and interna-
tional models as a means of achieving effective international regulation.
For the national model, this article selected the United States because it
was the first country to impose national restrictions on the export of pes-
ticides. For the regional model, this article selected the European Eco-
nomic Community because it has sovereign powers, and has been a
market-driven entity. For the international model, this article selected
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization because it has
the most far-reaching code on the regulation of pesticides. The Article
then compares these national, regional, and international models and of-
fers recommendations on the development of international regulation of
the sale and use of pesticides.
I. BACKGROUND
The rise in global trade has drawn pesticides into the international
arena. The varieties and uses of pesticides available internationally have
mushroomed over the past thirty years.1 Companies in the following
seven countries have dominated the export trade worldwide: West Ger-
many, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Ja-
* Charlotte Uram is a partner with the law firm of Landels, Ripley & Diamond in San Fran-
cisco, California. She practices environmental law and is Chair of the Subcommittee on Pesticides,
International Environmental Law Committee, American Bar Association. The views expressed in
this article are her own.
I United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Environment, Energy, and
Natural Resources Subcommittee, Committee oan Government Operations, House of Representatives
PESTICIDES: EXPORT OF UNREGISTERED PEScrDEs Is NOT ADEQUATELY MoNrroRED BY EPA,
April 1989, p. 10, GAO/RCED-89-128 [hereinafter 1989 GAO Report].
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pan, and Italy.2 Growth continued steadily throughout the post-war
period. From 1977 to 1987, worldwide pesticide sales doubled, reaching
17 billion dollars.3 The United Nations predicts increased growth to the
year 200. 4
The international market sought pesticides because they offer sub-
stantial public benefits. The dramatic role of pesticides in reducing the
incidence of insect-borne diseases is well-known.' Thus, although it is
now banned in many countries, India still uses DDT because it is vital in
their fight against malaria.' Pesticides reduce the incidence of disease
not only by killing insects but also by killing bacteria in medical equip-
ment, homes, and schools.
7
Pesticides are highly valued because of their role in enhancing crop
production. Pesticides fight weeds, molds, insects, rodents, and diseases
that can otherwise destroy 40 to 50 percent of the crops in a country."
Many developing nations, including India, Brazil, and Mexico9, turned
to pesticides in order to share in the "Green Revolution." 10 Pesticides
enabled India, for example, to attain self-sufficiency and export surplus
food."
Pesticide use brought with it, however, its own set of environmental
problems. By the early 1980's, authorities estimated at least 500,000
cases of accidental pesticide poisoning annually, resulting in approxi-
mately 10,000 deaths." Developing countries bore a disproportionate
share of the poisonings and deaths, largely because of misuse. 3 People
in Africa and Latin America stored food and water in empty pesticide
containers, local distributors packed pesticides in flimsy makeshift pack-
2 PILLS, PESTICIDES & PROMrrS: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN Toxic SUBsTANcES 7-8 (R.
Norris ed. 1982) [hereinafter PILLs, PEsIcmEs & PROMS]; See also 1989 GAO Report, supra note
2, at 2-11.
3 1989 GAO Report, supra note 2, at 10.
4 International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides, U.N. FAO Res. 10/
85 Annex, (28 November 1985).
5 1989 GAO Report, supra note 2, at 8.
6 Sinons, Concern Rising Over Harm From Pesticides In Third World, N.Y. Times, May 30,
1989, at C4, col. 1.
7 1989 GAO Report, supra note 2, at 8.
8 Prabhu, International Pesticide Regulatory Programs, 30 ENV'T 43, 45 (1989).
9 See generally Halter, Regulating Information Exchange and International Trade in Pesticides
and Other Toxic Substances to Meet the Needs of Developing Countries, 12 Cohm. . Envt'l L. 1
(1987).
10 PiLus, P'sncDEs & PROMrS, supra note 3, at 7.
11 Prabhu, supra note 9, at 43.
12 Pallemaerts, Developments in International Pesticides Regulation, 18 ENVrL. POL'Y & L. 62,
63 (1988), citing D. BULL, A GROWING PROBLEM: PESTIDES AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR 38
(1982).
13 Prabhu, supra note 9, at 45.
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ages, farm workers toiled without protection in hot climates, and villag-
ers used pesticides as an easy way to kill fish, thus poisoning their food
and water supply. 4 Illiteracy compounded these problems."5
Developed countries, too, suffered from pesticide use. Although
their accidental poisoning rate was not as high, proportionately, as that
in developing countries, their heavy pesticide use over the last forty years
has contaminated water sources with pesticide residues.16 In addition,
international trade in food exposed their consumers to the so-called "cir-
cle of poison," the import of food tainted with unsafe pesticides that are
banned or severely restricted in the importing country. Rising sensitivity
to the problems associated with pesticide use have led some to urge re-
consideration of current pesticide use practices. Pesticide Action Net-
work, the major international grass roots organization of people
concerned about pesticides, campaigns to stop the use of those pesticides
for which safe use cannot be assured. The organization also promotes
alternatives to pesticides. Pesticide Action Network initiated a "Dirty
Dozen" campaign in 1985 to eliminate the use of twelve pesticides. 7
Pesticide Action Network also promotes education about and alterna-
tives to pesticides, and offers assistance in evaluating non-chemical pest
control methods.1
Experiments with alternatives to chemical pesticides, such as biolog-
ical controls, crop rotation, proper tillage practices, and the use of pest-
resistant plants, have increased in recent years. People turn to these al-
ternatives to combat pests" that have grown immune to pesticides. The
alternatives also are used for environmental and economic reasons. Stah-
mann Farms in New Mexico, perhaps the world's largest single pecan
orchard, had, over the course of forty-two years, used nine different pes-
ticides, moving to the next one each time the aphids became immune to
the chemical. Two years ago they eliminated the pesticides and reintro-
duced ladybugs. With dramatically reduced costs, they are harvesting
14 Halter, supra note 10, at 4-5; PiLs, PESnCmES & PROFM, supra note 3, at 13-14.
15 PILLS, PESTICIDES & PROfITS, supra note 3, at 15; Simons, supra note 7.
16 International Environmental Reporter, December 1988, p. 663 (presence of pesticide residues
in drinking water has become a national problem in the Netherlands); International Environmental
Reporter, February 1989, p. 6 0 (the European Community accepted a complaint from Friends of the
Earth over excessive pesticides in water in the United Kingdom).
17 The twelve pesticides on the "Dirty Dozen" list are: toxaphene, cblordane/heptachlor,
chlordineform, dibromochloropropane (DBCP), DDT, adrin/dieldrin/endrin, ethylene dibromide
(EDB), lindane/hexachlorocyclohexane, paraquat, ethyl parathion, pentachlorophenol (PCP) and
2,4,5-T.
18 G. GOLDENMAN & S. RENGAM, PROBLEM PESTICIDES, PESTICIDE PROBLEMS 97-100 (1988)
[hereinafter GOLDENMAN].
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"one of the highest quality crops ever." 19 Similarly, Indonesia brought
the brown planthopper levels under control through an integrated pest
management system which used only limited amounts of insecticide.20
Changes in consumer taste may also accelerate shifts away from pes-
ticide use. The market for organic foods has grown as people seek to
avoid toxic chemicals. The recent Alar scare in the United States ad-
vanced that trend. The United States Department of Agriculture re-
cently stated that within the next decade organic farm production may
constitute ten percent of the nation's agriculture.2"
Because of these changes, the pace of growth in pesticide use world-
wide may slacken. Pesticide use may become more limited and more
selective. These trends, however, are not the dominant ones now. Pesti-
cide use is still substantial, widespread, and growing. Therefore, societies
are increasingly seeking ways to allow people to enjoy the important ben-
efits of chemical pesticides without suffering unreasonable risk from their
use. To achieve that goal, societies generally turn to regulation of the
sale and use of pesticides.
II. THE UNITED STATES
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") is the primary law in the United States governing the sale
and use of pesticides. Corigress enacted FIFRA in 1947 to ensure prod-
uct performance.2' In 1972, responding to rising environmental con-
cerns, Congress amended FIFRA to incorporate measures designed to
protect public health and safety. 24 The resulting statute embodies both
the original and subsequent goals.
A. Provisions Applicable to Sale and Use Within the United States
FIFRA controls the sale and use of pesticides in the United States
through a system of registration. .FIFRA prohibits the sale of any pesti-
cide in the United States unless it is registered with the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).25 Before registering a pesti-
cide, EPA must determine that:
19 San Francisco Chron., Dec. 3, 1989, (Magazine), at 17.
20 GOLDENMAN, supra note 19, at 101-02.
21 San Francisco Chron., Ian. 13, 1990, at B3.
22 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-1 36y (1980).
23 See House Comm. on Agric., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, H.R. No.
313, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1947 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1200.
24 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972);
1989 GAO Report, supra note 2.
25 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1980).
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1. The pesticide "will perform its intended function...; 2 6
2. It is properly labeled with product composition, warnings and instruc-
tions;27 and
3. Its use will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment."
28
FIFRA defines "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" to in-
clude not only environmental but also economic and social effects.29
Registration may be conditioned on terms restricting use. If, for ex-
ample, EPA determines that inhaling or touching a pesticide presents a
hazard, EPA may require that it be applied "only by or under the direct
supervision of a certified applicator."30 Additionally, registration may be
suspended or cancelled. EPA may suspend registration to prevent immi-
nent hazard to human health. It may cncel registration if "it appears
to" the EPA that the pesticide no longer complies with FIFRA.31
B. Provisions Applicable to Pesticides Exported
From the United States
FIFRA does not extend the domestic registration system to the sale
of pesticides for export and does not prohibit the export of unregistered
pesticides from the United States.32 FIFRA does, however, use the regis-
tration system to regulate pesticides for export. "
Before an unregistered pesticide may be lawfully exported from the
United States, FIFRA requires that the foreign purchaser acknowledge
in writing that the pesticide is unregistered.33 The export manufacturer
obtains from the foreign purchaser and submits to EPA a statement ac-
26 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(c)(5)(c) (1980).
27 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(c)(5)(b) (1980).
28 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(c) (1980).
29 7 U.S.C. § 136(b)gb) (1980) ("'unreasonable adverse effects on the environment' means any
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environ-
mental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide").
30 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(d)(1)(c)() (1980).
31 7 U.S.C. § 136(d)(b)(l) (1980).
32 Unregistered pesticides reportedly constitute approximately 30 percent of the exported prod-
ucts. PILLS, PFSTCIDES & PROFrTS, supra note 3, at 7-8. Pesticides may be unregistered for several
reasons: the manufacturer may have decided not to market the pesticide in the United States and
therefore not to register, the pesticide registration may have been cancelled for marketing or public
health reasons; or the pesticide registration application may be pending. There have been numerous
bills introduced in Congress over the last ten years t6 ban the export of unregistered pesticides. The
latest, at the time of submission of this article, is S. 1989 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) entitled "The
Global Ban on Dangerous Pesticides Act," introduced by Senator Pete Wilson (R.-California).
33 7 U.S.C. § 136o(a)(2) (1980); Labelling Requirements for Exported Pesticides, Devices, and
Pesticide Active Ingredients and Procedures for Exporting Unregistered Pesticides, 45 Fed. Reg.
50273 (1980) (Statement of Policy) [hereinafter Labelling Requirements].
International Regulation of Pesticides
10:460(1990)
knowledging that the purchaser understands that the product is not reg-
istered for use in the United States. The statement includes:
1. The name and address of the exporter;
2. The name and address of the foreign purchaser;
3. The identification of the product and active ingredient;
4. An indication that the purchaser understands the product is not
registered for use in the United States; and
5. The destination of the shipment.
EPA sends copies of the statements to the United States embassies
in the importing countries for their submission to appropriate officials in
those countries. The statements are informational only; shipments may
proceed upon submission of the foreign purchaser statements to EPA. 4
FIFRA also requires the EPA to advise foreign governments and
appropriate international agencies of the cancellation or suspension of
registered pesticides."5 Through these measures, Congress sought to give
users and user countries information about unregistered pesticides manu-
factured in and exported from the United States. 6
Adequate labelling for export of all pesticides, registered or unregis-
tered is also required by FIFRA. Labels for pesticides shipped overseas
must meet most of the labeling requirements applied to pesticides sold in
the United States.
37
In sum, the United States has a law regulating the sale and use of
pesticides in the United States. It employs a system of pesticide registra-
tion that requires a balancing of economic and environmental costs and
benefits. The law also provides for notifications to other countries in con-
nection with the export of pesticides not registered in the United States.3 8
34 1989 GAO Report, supra note 2, at 2, 11-12, and 19. Although the statements are only infor-
mational, countries opposed to importation of the unregistered pesticides may use their sovereign
powers to prevent future importation.
35 7 U.S.C. § 136(o)(b) (1980).
3 6 TIle United States General Accounting Office in the 1989 GAO Report criticized EPA for
inadequate implementation and enforcement of the export notification requirements and the cancel-
lation notice provisions. 1989 GAO Report, supra note 2, at 3.
37 See Labelling Requirements, supra note 34.
38 FIFRA is not, of course, the only Federal law regulating pesticides in the United States. For
example, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, establishes maximum allowable limits of pesti-
cide residues in food. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The Clean Air Act, regulates air emissions from pesti-
cides. Clean Air Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
The Clean Water Act, regulates discharges of pesticides into surface water. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, ch. 927, 66 Stat. 755 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). The
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, regulates pesticide waste. Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 1227 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.) The Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act, regulates pesticide
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I1. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The European Economic Community C'EEC") was created by the
1957 Treaty of Rome. 39 The EEC is a powerful regional organization
because its Member States transferred to it a portion of their sovereign
powers.4
A. Environmental Regulation in General
The Treaty of Rome did not specifically authorize the EEC to ad-
dress environmental issues. The EEC nevertheless did address environ-
mental issues to achieve its goal of abolishing trade obstacles between the
Member States. Differing environmental and product regulations in the
different- Member States created obstacles to free trade. Therefore, the
EEC developed environmental programs to harmonize the Community
requirements. The EEC initiated these efforts in earnest in 1972 by
adopting a series of environmental programs.41
On February 14, 1987, the Member States amended the Treaty of
Rome by signing the Single European Act, which took effect July 1,
1987.42 The Single European Act inserted into the EEC treaty a new
Environmental Title. Articles 130r through 130t set the environmental
objectives and authority for the EEC. Among the provisions are the fol-
lowing principles:
-preventative action should be taken
wastes. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 1909 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C., and 49 U.S.C.). In addition, the Export Administration Act, can be used to prohibit export
of pesticides. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
39 EEC membei states signing the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 were Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark
joined on January 1, 1973. Greecejoined on January 1, 1981. Spain and Portugaljoined on January
1, 1986. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
40 Costa v. EN.EL., 10 Recueil 1141, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
118023 (1964) (Member states transferred sovereign powers to the Community).
41 See Rehbinder & Stewart, Legal Integration in Federal Systems: European Community Envi-
ronmentalLaw, 33 AM. Y. Comp. L. 371, 383 (1985). The EEC adopted a Programme on Environ-
ment in 1973, 16 O.. (No. C 112) 1 (1973). The EEC modified the Programme by Council
Resolution in 1977, 20 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. C 139) 1 (1977); by Council Resolution in 1983, 26
O.J. (No. C 46) 1 (1983); and by Council Resolution in 1987, 30 O.. (No. C 328) 1 (1987). These
programs were generally intended to be five-year action programs. See Vandermeersch, The Single
European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European Economic Community, 12 EUR. L. REv.
407, 409 (1987); Haagsma, Environmental Policy:.A Case Study in Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INTr. L.
J. 311, 317 (1989).
42 30 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 169) 1 (1987).
International Regulation of Pesticides
10:.40(1990)
-environmental damage should be rectified at its source at the ex-
pense of the polluter
-economic and social developments in the Community as a whole
and the balanced development of its regions should be taken into account
in environmental matters
-the Community should take action only if the objectives can be bet-
ter attained-by the Community than by the individual states
-the Community and the Member States will cooperate, within their
respective spheres of competence, with third countries and international
organizations
-action will be unanimous unless the Council decides certain meas-
ures may be determined by a qualified majority.43
In the environmental area, the EEC has usually proceeded by direc-
tive rather than by regulation. A regulation applies directly within each
Member State. ' A directive, however, is addressed to the Member
States and requires them to achieve by a certain date the goals, standards
or requirements specified in the directive4 The Member States are free
to choose how to comply with the directive within the parameters set by
the directive. They are also responsible to enforce the requirements
within their respective jurisdictions. A Member State that fails to fulfill
its obligations under the EEC Treaty is subject to suit by the EEC Com-
mission and other Member States in the European Court of Justice and
may also be subject to suit in its national courts under national law.46
B. Pesticide Regulation in the EEC
Unlike the United States, the EEC does not have any system for
registration or prior approval of pesticides marketed for sale within the
Community. In 1976, the Commission entertained, but did not adopt, a
proposal for a Council directive on the marketing of pesticides author-
ized for the European Community.47 The Commission now appears to
favor a system allowing marketing of any pesticide approved within any
Member State, unless banned by the EEC.
48
The EEC has, however, adopted directives concerning pesticides.
Directive 78/631, which took effect in 1985, harmonizes the laws of the
43 For additional information and commentary about the Environmental Title of the Single Eu-
ropean Act See Vandermeersch, supra note 42, at 407 and Haagsma, supra note 42, at 311.
44 Treaty of Rome, supra note 40. at Article 189.
45 Id.
46 Id. at Art. 169-170.
47 19 O3. Eur. Comm. (No. C 212) 3 (1976).
48 See E. REHEINDER & R. STEwART, H INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION POLICY 95 (1985).
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Member States on the classification, packaging, and labeling of pesti-
cides.49 Although directed to the Member States, it contains specific pro-
visions which appear regulatory in nature. It requires use of the criteria
in the Directive to determine the health hazards of pesticides and to
classify them accordingly as "very toxic," "toxic," or "harmful." 50
Member States are to ensure that pesticide labels provide specified infor-
mation concerning its preparation, its hazards, and its proper use.51 To
promote consistency and clarity, the Directive dictates the appropriate
symbols and wording of key phrases. The Directive specifies the size and
location of the labeling. Criteria on the strength, leak-tightness, fasten-
ing, shape, and presentation of pesticide packaging also is established by
the Directive.52 Member States are not permitted to authorize the sale of
pesticides that do not comply with the packaging provisions of the
Directive.
53
The EEC also adopted a directive banning certain active substances
in pesticides.' The Directive requires Member States to prohibit, with
limited exceptions, the sale and use of pesticides with certain mercury
compounds and certain organo-chlorine compounds, such as DDT, al-
drin, dieldrin, chlordane, endrin, heptachlor, and hexachlorobenzene.
The prohibitions of this Directive apply to products intended for sale and
use in the EEC, not those intended for export to other countries.55
The EEC lacks rules governing export of pesticides from the Com-
munity to third countries. The Community has debated the issue since
1986. West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, the EEC's
main exporters of pesticides, have vigorously opposed export controls,
49 Directive of 1978 on classification, packaging and labeling of pesticides, Directive 78/631 of
26 June 1978, 21 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 206) 13 (1978), as amended by Directive 79/831, 22 Oj.
Eur. Comm. (No. L 259) 10 (1979); Directive 81/187, 24 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 88) 29 (1981);
and Directive 84/291, 27 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 144) 1 (1984).
50 Directive 78/631, Articles 3, 4 and 5; 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 206) art. 3 at 15 (1978).
51 Id. at art. 7,8, at 16-17.
52 Id. at art. 6, at 16.
53 Id. at art. 5, at 15.
54 Directive of December 21, 1978 prohibiting the placing on the market on the market and use
of plant protection products containing certain active substances, Directive 79/117, 33 OJ. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 33) 36 (1979).
55 There are various other directives relating to pesticides. For example, Directive 76/895 limits
pesticide residues in fruit and vegetables, 19 O. Eur. Comm. (No. L 340) 26 (1976). Water quality
directives affect pesticides. Directive 80/778 of 15 July 1980, 23 0.1. Eur. Comm. (No. L 229) 11
(1980) (limits pesticides in drinking water); Directive 80/68 of December 17, 1979, 23 O3. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 20) 43 (1980) (water pollution of groundwater); Directive 76/464 of May 4, 1976, 19
0.3. Eur. Comm. (No. L 129) 23 (1976) (water pollution of surface and internal coastal waters);
Directive 84/360 of 28 June 1984,27 O.J. (No. L 188) (1984) (requires member states to regulate air
pollution from industrial plants); Directive 78/319 of March 20, 1978, 21 O.L Eur. Comm. (No. L
84) 43 (1978) (on toxic and dangerous waste disposal including pesticides).
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favoring limited voluntary notification schemes only.5
6
In sum, the EEC has established a directive requiring Member
States to harmonize their laws governing the classification, packaging
and labeling of pesticides. The EEC has also banned certain pesticides
from the EEC market. 'The Community has not, however, asserted au-
thority to decide which pesticides may be marketed in the EEC nor
which may be exported and under what terms to third countries.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
ORGANIZATION
A. Context of the Code's Development
In 1985, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) adopted an International Code of Conduct on the Distribution
and Use of Pesticides (the "Code") to reduce the hazards associated with
the use of pesticides.57
the Code represents a compromise between the industrialized coun-
tries manufacturing and exporting pesticides and developing countries
importing them. Many developing countries do not have the legal, tech-
nical, and administrative resources to control the sale and use of pesti-
cides and thus can not protect the health and environment of their
people. The industrialized nations impose stringent controls to protect
their own populace but generally have no controls on exports to develop-
ing countries. The result has been a proportionately greater incidence of
poisoning in developing countries. Developing countries became angry
over the industrialized nations' "double standard" which exposed their
people to hazards unacceptable in the industrialized nations. Because the
developing countries outnumbered the industrialized pesticide-exporting
countries in international organizations, the governments of the industri-
alized countries took the initiative and sought a compromise. One prod-
uct of that compromise was the Code."'
The Code sought to provide a way to reduce the risks of pesticide
use, particularly in those countries without adequate pesticide registra-
tion and control schemes.59 The Code established voluntary standards,
relying on cooperative efforts. At its adoption, "[ilt [was] designed to be
mainly an interim measure until adequate national regulations are
56 Simons, supra note 7; Pallemaerts, supra note 13, at 67.
57 U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, International Code of Conduct on the Distribution
and Use of Pesticides, U.N. Doc. M/R8130, E/8.86/1/5000 (I986) [hereinafter Code].
58 For further discussion of this history and the other consequences, see Pallemaerts supra note
13, at 62.
59 Code, supra note 56, at Annex.
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instituted."'
B. The Code Provisions on Pesticides
The Code establishes voluntary, legally non-binding standards of
conduct for all governmental, public, and private entities associated with
the distribution and use of pesticides.61 Its language is general and wide-
ranging.
Article 3, for example, on pesticide management, states that "Gov-
ernments have the overall responsibility and should take the specific
powers to regulate the distribution and use of pesticides in their coun-
tries."'62 The same article directs governments of exporting countries to
"provide technical assistance to other countries" 63 and "ensure that good
trading practices are followed."" It urges manufacturers and traders in
pesticides to adhere to the Code provisions in the manufacture, distribu-
tion and advertising of pesticides, especially in countries without legisla-
tion or regulation, and to take special care to ensure safe and effective use
of the product worldwide.65 It requests that all entities and organiza-
tions, including public sector groups, provide information and dissemi-
nate educational materials on pesticides and their use.' Under Article 3
of the Code, everyone bears and shares broad responsibility.
Similarly, Article 4 on testing of pesticides, states that "[pesticide
manufacturers are expected to " ensure adequate testing of pesticides in
accordance with sound scientific procedures and good laboratory prac-
tices.67 The Code does not specify those tests and practices, but the FAO
and other international organizations have published guidelines on these
tests and practices. The manufacturers are also expected to make copies
or summaries of the tests available to governments where the pesticide is
offered for sale.6" They are to see that the proposed use, label and direc-
tions accurately reflect the outcome of the tests, and they are to provide
any technical training necessary.6 9
Article 10, on labelling, packaging, storage, and disposal, also di-
rects most of its standards to industry. It states that "Industry should
60 AN. Adam, The International Code of Conduct on the Diribution and Use of Pe.ticides, 23
CrC REPORTER 45 (1987).
61 Code, supra note 58, at art. 1.
62 Id. at art. 3.1.
63 Id. at art. 3.3.1.
64 Id. at art. 3.3.2.
65 Id. at art. 3.2, 3.4.
66 Id. at art. 3.6, 5.4.
67 Id. at art. 4.1.1, 4.1.2.
68 Id. at art. 4.1.3.
69 Id. at art. 4.1.4.
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use labels that" show the appropriate hazard classification of warnings70;
use appropriate symbols or pictograms, whenever possible, in addition to
written warnings and instructions7 l; warn against reuse of the contain-
ers72 and provide product batch or lot information7 . Reflecting an in-
temational concern about the reuse of pesticide containers for food
storage, the Code also places burdens on governments. Specifically,
"[glovemments should take the necessary regulatory measures to pro-
hibit the repacking, decanting or dispensing of any pesticide into food or
beverage containers in trade channels and rigidy enforce punitive meas-
ures that effectively deter such practices."74
The Code also establishes in Article 12 a general prescription that
"Governments should monitor the observance of the Code and report on
progress made to the Director-General of FAO."75 In accordance with
Article. 12 of the Code, the FAO issued a questionnaire designed to indi-
cate the extent to which countries were observing the Code. Seventy-
three percent of the countries responded to the questionnaire in 1988. Of
the 115 responding countries, 84 developing countries stated that they
did not have adequate governmental resources to control pesticides and
comply fully with the Code. Africa had the greatest number-of countries
with difficulty observing the Code.76
C. The Amendment of the Code to Incorporate
Prior Informed Consent
One of the issues left unresolved by adoption of the Code in 1985
was the issue of "prior informed consent." The principle of "prior in-
formed consent?! would allow importing countries the opportunity to re-
fuse shipments of pesticides banned or severely restricted in exporting
countries. Early drafts of the Code had provided for prior informed con-
sent, but pressure from industry resulted in its deletion. A last-minute
effort by the developing countries to reinstate it failed. The developing
countries ultimately consented to the 1985 Code but recorded their reser-
70 Id. at art. 10.2.3.
71 Id. at art. 10.2.2.
72 Id. at art. 10.2.4.
73 Id. at art. 10.2.5.
74 Id. at art. 10.4.
75 Id. at art. 12.6.
76 International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides Analysis of Re-
spounses to the Questionnaire by Governments, Background Paper Number 1, January 1989, AGP/
GC/89/BP.1. According to a report by Pesticide Education and Action Project, pesticide use prac-
tices in three parts of the United States (California, Louisiana and Ohio) and one province of Canada
also failed to meet the standards of the Code. See International Environmental Reporter, May 11,
1988, p. 295.
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vation that prior informed consent did not appear in the Code and asked
that the Code be revised to include it. In response to concerns by devel-
oping countries, the FAO in November 1987 adopted a resolution decid-
ing that prior informed consent should be incorporated into the Code
within two years. 7 In November 1989, the FAO amended the Code to
adopt the principle of prior informed consent.78
Article 9.7 on prior informed consent (PIC) states:
Pesticides that are banned or severely restricted for reasons of health or the
environment are subject to the Prior Informed Consent procedure. No pes-
ticide in these categories should be exported to an importing country partic-
ipating in the PIC procedure contrary to that country's decision made in
accordance with the FAO operational procedures for PIC.
FAO's operational procedures for PIC and the guidelines accompanying
the amendments to the Code provide an eight-step process in which the
FAO plays a central organizational role. The eight steps are summarized
below.
Step 1 - FAO invites member importing states to participate in the
PIC process. Those responding affirmatively will be included in the pro-
cess. All pesticide exporting nations are expected to participate.
Step 2 - Participating nations designate the appropriate authority for
giving and receiving notice in the process.
Step 3 - The national authorities designated in Step 2 advise the
FAO of all actions taken in the country to ban, refuse registration or
severely restrict a pesticide for health or environmental reasons.
Step 4 - For each pesticide for which notice is received under Step 3
and for any pesticide selected by an FAO expert panel on acutely hazard-
ous pesticides, the FAO will develop a 'TIC Decision Guidance
Document".
Step 5 - The PIC Decision Guidance Document will be sent to the
participating countries for response and to other countries for their infor-
mation. The document will summarize information on the pesticides,
chemical and physical properties, uses, source of exposure, toxicity pro-
file and regulatory status in other countries.
Step 6 - The participating importing country will advise FAO within
90 days whether it will allow imports of the pesticide in question. The
importing country may make a final decision to ban import, in which
case it will also discontinue any domestic production of the pesticide.
77 For further discussion of this debate, see Pallemaerts, supra note 13, at 67.
78 Revision of Articles 2 and 9 of the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use
of Pesticides, and Guidelines on the Operation of Prior Informed Consent, adopted 21 November
1989.
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Alternatively, the importingcountry may make an interim response. If a
country makes no response, the status quo with respect to importations
will be maintained.
Step 7 - The FAO will advise all designated national authorities of
the responses of individual countries and maintain a database on country
decisions.
Step 8 - Designated national authorities of exporting countries will
inform the pesticide export industry and appropriate authorities- of the
decisions by importing countries.
The FAO thus has established wide-ranging standards for pesticides
generally and unique standards for prior informed consent. Although
the Code is only a voluntary standard, upon its adoption, it represented a
global consensus on the standards that should govern the sale and use of
pesticides.
V. COMPARISON OF THE MODELS
The United Staites, the EEC and the United Nations FAO models
have certain obvious differences. Structurally, the United States provi-
sions are generally the strongest because they are legally binding and di-
rectly applicable.79 The EEC provisions are legally binding, too, but,
because they were issued as directives rather than regulations, they apply
to the Member States and are not directly applicable within each Mem-
ber State. The FAQ provisions are structurally the weakest because they
are not legally binding.
In terms of export, the FAO Code is the most far-reaching because
it provides for prior informed consent. The FAO's strength in this area
is not surprising since a primary motivation in the development of the
Code was to protect Third World countries without adequate internal
regulation of pesticides. The United States also has provisions governing
export, but they are weaker than the Code's because they are only infor-
mational. The EEC lacks provisions governing export of pesticides.
In terms of controlling sale and use within its jurisdiction, the
United States' law is the most rigorous because it requires registration of
pesticides prior to sale and use. The EEC does not require registration,
and the FAO Code does not specifically address the means to control sale
or use.
From this brief comparison, it would appear that the nation model
of regulation may be the strongest and thus bear the most fruit for inter-
national regulation of pesticides. In fact, that is not the conclusion of
79 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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this article. The.discussion below compares the strengths and weak-
nesses of the preceding national, regional and international models as a
means for international regulation of pesticides.
A. National Model
Relying solely on national regulation to provide a means for regula-
tion of pesticides internationally holds little promise for two reasons.
First, many countries do not have adequate pesticide regulations. Sec-
ond, those that do are unlikely to effectively regulate export of pesticides
unilaterally because it potentially injures domestic business and market
position.
Those favoring the nation model of international regulations argue
that the burden should be on nations to regulate pesticide sale and use
within their countries. The theory is that nations, by exercising their
sovereign powers, would establish sound pesticide regulations enabling
people to enjoy the many benefits of pesticide use without suffering the
worst costs. National regulation can be specific to the needs, values and
circumstances of each country. It respects the sovereignty of each coun-
try. It also frees other countries and companies from the burden of de-
ciding how to protect their neighbors and customers.
In fact, a system in which each nation has a separate and distinct
form of pesticide regulations would probably increase international fric-
tions by erecting barriers to trade, which would frustrate companies and
governments alike, and by setting differing standards affecting food im-
ports and groundwater pollution and other matters extending beyond na-
tional boundaries. In any event, scores of countries do not have adequate
pesticide controls because they do not have the resources to adopt, ad-
minister, or enforce regulations. Therefore, the nation model of interna-
tional regulation, even if it were ideal, is unworkable at the present time.
Assuming that not all nations regulate pesticides, a form of interna-
tional pesticide regulation could still emerge from the nation model if
exporting countries were to act mdi "dually to regulate exported pesti-
cides. The problem with this nation Model is that countries are not likely
to take actions to harm their dogestic business or market position
through unilateral regulation. If the did, the companies could relocate
elsewhere and continue exporting frdm the new home country. The orig-
inal exporting company would thus injure itself without achieving the
aim desired by the export regulations.
The United States, it is true, unilaterally adopted export regulations.
Upon closer examination, however, these export regulations appear
weak. First, they are informational only. The United States need only
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inform importing countries of the shipment of banned or restricted pesti-
cides. It need not seek or await any response.8"
Second, the United States provisions on export of pesticides are re-
portedly not functioning properly. In 1989, the United States General
Accounting Office concluded that after a decade, EPA's implementation
of the export provisions in FIFRA was still inadequate.8' The General
Accounting Office found the following flaws: (1) EPA had no program
for determining whether export manufacturers are complying with the
program and does not know if they are; (2) EPA's policy interpreting the
export provisions exempted most unregistered pesticide exports from the
notice requirements; 82 and (3) EPA had no procedures for and has failed
to issue the required notices to other governments upon cancellation or
suspension of the registration of a pesticide.
e Finally, the United States provisions on export of pesticides may not
be enforceable. The enforceability of FIFRA's export provisions on for-
eign purchaser statements and government notifications is not clear from
the text of the statute. The statute, for example, does not explicitly im-
pose on anyone the duty to obtain the foreign purchaser statement. The
statute simply says: "No pesticide... shall be deemed in violation... if,
prior to purchase, the foreign purchaser has signed a statement .... 83
Without a statutory duty on someone, there is no violator and thus no
enforcement. Similarly, the statutory section designating unlawful acts
under FIFRA does not refer to or explicitly include the section requiring
foreign purchaser statements, again raising questions about the enforce-
ability of these provisions.84
Similar questions surround the enforceability of the government's
obligations to give foreign purchaser statements and pesticide cancella-
tion notices to importing countries. FIFRA identifies the government as
the entity responsible to take these actions, but exempts public officials in
the performance of their official duties from liability.85 From the struc-
ture of the statute and its language, one cannot readily discern whether
Congress intended simply to prevent assessment of penalties against gov-
ernment officials who fail to perform statutory duties, or whether Con-
80 7 U.S.C. § 136(oXa) (1989).
81 1989 GAO Report, supra note 2.
82 The policy exempts unregistered pesticides that are minor variations on formulas registered in
the United States and contain only active ingredients registered in the United States. 45 Fed. Reg.
50274, 50275-76 (1980).
83 7 U.S.C. § 136(o)(a) (1989).
84 7 U.S.C. § 136G) (1989).
85 7 U.S.C § 136Gj(b)(3) (1989).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 10:460(1990)
gress also intended to define their acts as not unlawful, thus preventing a
court from granting injunctive relief against them.
In sum, the nation model has the appeal, in international regulation,
of respecting sovereignty and national differences. As a means to pro-
duce international regulation of pesticides, however, it is unlikely to suc-
ceed because it requires either that all nations have operational
regulations on the sale and use of pesticides, or, alternatively, that all
exporting nations individually place restrictions on their own businesses
to provide significant protections for importing countries. Both forms
ask too much of individual nations.
B. Regional Model
The regional approach represented by the EEC has significant ad-
vantages over the nation model of international regulation.8" First, the
regional model allows nations to take steps in concert with other nations,
thus reducing the competitive disadvantage of regulation to any one na-
tion. Second, it harmonizes national requirements, which facilitates free
trade. The regional model thus offers economic benefit in exchange for
regulation, making it potentially more successful. The regional model
does, however, have limitations for the international regulation of pesti-
cides. The first is that it is only regional. For third countries outside the
regions, the nation model may again be dominant, as nations seek to pre-
serve all trading opportunities with third countries without restraint.
That has been true of the EEC. The second is that it will probably suc-
ceed only where there are no dramatic differences in capabilities among
the nations within the region. Harmonizing regulations is not a realistic
goal between highly developed countries and developing countries. De-
spite these limitations, the regional model offers a greater likelihood of
success for international regulation than the national model.
C. International Model
The international model, the United Nations FAO Code, would ap-
pear to offer the greatest likelihood of success in international regulation
because it sets international standards applicable to all nations. This sys-
tem is potentially the most orderly way to regulate to the common
benefit.
The FAO Code, however, was not devised as an enforceable, bind-
ing document. It was designed primarily to protect those countries with-
86 "Regional model" is not intended to be limited to nations within a geographical area. Instead,
it speaks to similarly situated nations entering into a treaty for common advantage.
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out adequate pesticide regulation through a program of voluntary,
cooperative action by governments, pesticide manufacturers and export-
ers, and non-governmental organizations such as public interest groups.
The voluntary aspect of the Code would appear to be a serious flaw in the
regulatory system, giving rise to the question whether the Code should be
converted to a treaty so that it will become a binding international
regulation.
Converting the Code to a treaty now cannot be easily done. First,
the language in the Code is not directly transferable to a binding treaty.
Much of it is general and exhortatory. Binding language would have to
be significantly more specific, so that those subject to it would know ex-
actly what the language requires.
Devising the necessary specific language would be difficult because
of the gap in the regulatory capabilities of countries in the world. Any
binding treaty would either have low standards that all can meet or
higher standards that those countries most in need would necessarily vio-
late. In that context, making the Code legally binding would not signifi-
cantly advance its goal of promoting international regulations to ensure
safe use of pesticides in all countries. The resources at this stage might
be better spent on scientific and educational programs designed to close
the gap, using the FAO Code as a beacon, rather than on efforts to try to
eliminate the gap through legal declaration.
In any event, before struggling to convert the Code to a binding
document, it makes sense to see if the voluntary Code is accomplishing
its objectives and in what areas and to what extent. The Code is a recent
document, with its most controversial provision, prior informed consent,
adopted only within the last year, on November 21, 1989. It should be
given an opportunity to work so that all countries can evaluate.the volun-
tary Code and determine those aspects that are most successful and those
that may be more successful as binding law.
Viewed in perspective, the system is evolving. Transforming the
FAO Code into a legally binding document now may not significantly
advance international regulation of pesticides, but given the continuing
global changes resulting from trade and computer communications, the
ingredients for successful enforceable international regulation may arise
in the not too distant future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The sale and use of pesticides worldwide has fostered a need for
international regulation of pesticides to promote their safe and beneficial
use. Reliance on laws within each sovereign nation is not likely to pro-
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duce successfd international regulation of pesticide sale and use. Re-
gional entities are better positioned to offer a successful model of
regulation. An international regulatory system binding all nations may
be the ideal model, but, at this point, appears premature. At the interna-
tional level, the best course for now is to devote resources to the science
and education needed to help developing countries and to evaluate, peri-
odically, the success of the voluntary compliance with the FAO Code.
Development of a legally binding international code may be guided by
experience drawn from the current voluntary Code.
